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It Is Just Unfair Using Trade Laws to “Out” Security
Software Vulnerabilities
Marian K. Riedy* & Bartlomiej Hanus**
In 2015, hackers gained access to hundreds of millions of consumer
data records housed in the databases and systems of American
businesses, and the number of records stolen climbed even higher the
following year. Though businesses spend billions of dollars each year on
security software and systems to protect data from unauthorized
disclosure, those systems often fail because of vulnerabilities in the
software that hackers exploit. All but the simplest software contains some
vulnerabilities, including coding errors. Pursuant to the observations of
previous legal scholarship, one of the reasons “bad code” (i.e., code
vulnerable to hacking) persists in the consumer market is that software
vendors insulate themselves from accountability using contractual
disclaimers of warranties and limitations on liability. One might expect,
by way of contrast, that in the commercial market for software and, in
particular, for security software, companies would demand that the
vendor share responsibility in the event of a data breach. But this
Article’s empirical analysis of end-user license agreements (i.e.,
agreements between the software vendor or developer and the software
user) for such security products demonstrates a similar liability shield in
the contractual terms. Therefore, companies cannot, or perhaps just will
not, hold security software vendors accountable. The result is an
unacceptable risk to consumers; therefore, this Article proposes that
regulators should reduce the risk by using unfair trade laws. Specifically,
this Article recommends that if a security software vendor knows of a
vulnerability in its code and fails to notify its licensees of that
vulnerability, it should be charged with committing an unfair trade
practice.

* Associate Professor, Emporia State University, School of Business. Before her academic
appointment, Dr. Riedy practiced law as a civil litigator in Washington, D.C. She is a graduate of
Harvard Law School.
** Assistant Professor, Emporia State University, School of Business. He received his Ph.D.
degree from the University of North Texas. His primary research interests revolve around
information security.
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INTRODUCTION
The title of a 2012 article in The Atlantic observed that “software runs
the world,” and then, chillingly, asked: “How scared should we be that so
much of it is so bad?”1 Referring therein to software errors that resulted
in millions of dollars in losses in securities trading, 2 the same question
might well be asked, however, in regard to the software and systems that
large and small businesses use to protect against data compromise.
It has often been observed that software—the programs computer
systems run on3—are vulnerable4 to an information security breach. That
is, one coding error in the software can give hackers unauthorized access
to confidential information on a computer hard drive that is embedded in
application software, passing from one networked computer to another,
or residing on a remote server.5 One technical solution to this problem is
1. James Kwak, Software Runs the World: How Scared Should We Be That So Much of It Is So
Bad?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/08/softwareruns-the-world-how-scared-should-we-be-that-so-much-of-it-is-so-bad/260846/.
2. Id.
3. Taiwo A. Oriola, Bugs for Sale: Legal and Ethical Proprieties of the Market in Software
Vulnerabilities, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 451, 452 (2011).
4. See generally Derek E. Bambauer, Schrödinger’s Cybersecurity, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791,
844 (2015) (“Complete prevention of inaccuracy is impossible . . . [s]oftware code displays
extraordinary complexity, leading inevitably to bugs. Hackers are adept at finding and exploiting
vulnerabilities . . . .”); Oriola, supra note 3, at 455 (explaining that most reported computer or
network security issues result from software vulnerabilities); Kevin R. Pinkney, Putting Blame
Where Blame Is Due: Software Manufacturer and Customer Liability for Security-Related Software
Failure, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 43, 51 (2002) (stating that many hackers’ strategies result from
programmers and system administrators failing to address known security issues and
vulnerabilities).
5. WHITE HOUSE, LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE: DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION, § 1(g)(1); see, e.g.,
Bambauer, supra note 4, at 844 (“Complete prevention of inaccuracy is impossible . . . [s]oftware
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to enhance the security features of computer operating systems and other
software.6 Another is to employ data security software and related
systems and services specifically designed to protect against breaches.
Hundreds of companies now sell such data security software and
systems.7 Their offerings range from antivirus software for installation
on home computers8 to enterprise systems designed to detect threats,
secure networks, and otherwise provide security for some of the largest
companies in the world.9 Fortune 500 companies reportedly spent $71
billion on data security systems in 2014.10 Cybersecurity Ventures
recently projected worldwide spending on commercial cybersecurity
products and services to eclipse $1 trillion for the period between 2017
and 2021.11 But like the underlying software running computers and
programs, security software is also vulnerable to attack.12
Vulnerabilities in software began to command the technical
community’s attention when the consumerization of the Internet gained
speed around 2005,13 and now, the magnitude and severity of the problem
code displays extraordinary complexity, leading inevitably to bugs.”); Oriola, supra note 3, at 463
(“A faulty code or bug is the Achilles’ heel of computer or network systems security, and one of
the weakest links through which networked computers are traditionally breached.”).
6. Emily Kuwahara, Torts v. Contracts: Can Microsoft Be Held Liable to Home Consumers for
Its Security Flaws?, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 997, 1006 (2007) (describing Microsoft’s “Trust Worthy
Computing Initiative” to improve the security of its operating systems).
7. Amanda N. Craig et al., Proactive Cybersecurity: A Comparative Industry and Regulatory
Analysis, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 721, 758 (2015). The Authors collected End User License Agreements
(“EULA”) available on the websites of three hundred seventy of such companies, ranging from
industry giants providing complex, customized solutions—such as Lockheed Martin—to
companies selling specific tools such as email filtering.
8. E.g.,
McAfee
Total
Protection,
MCAFEEA
FOR
CONSUMER,
https://promos.mcafee.com/offer.aspx?id=1094031 (last visited Apr. 12, 2017) (offering McAfee
Total Protection to consumers for purchase or thirty-day free trial).
9. Protect
Your
Digital
Enterprise,
HEWLETT
PACKARD
ENTERPRISE,
https://www.hpe.com/us/en/solutions/protect-digital.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2017).
10. Seth Rosenblatt, Modern Security Tactics Fail to Protect Against Malware, Study Finds,
CNET (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.cnet.com/news/modern-security-tactics-fail-to-protect-againstmalware-new-study-finds/.
11. Cybersecurity
Market
Report,
CYBERSECURITY
VENTURES,
http://cybersecurityventures.com/cybersecurity-market-report/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2017) (noting
the market for the second quarter of 2016).
12. See generally Stephen S. Gilstrap, Shifting the Burden in Software Licensing Agreements,
121 YALE L.J. 1271 (2012) (discussing the increasing potential liabilities associated with software
security breaches).
13. In 2005, the number of publicly reported vulnerabilities increased significantly. Also
around that time, a large number of easy-to-find bugs in web applications was discovered. The
National Vulnerability Database was created, resulting in an increased number of flaws reported
by large software companies. See Robert Lemos, Security Flaws on the Rise, Questions Remain,
REGISTER
(Jan.
6,
2006),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/01/09/computer_security_flaws_on_the_rise/ (discussing the
increasing amount of vulnerabilities and software flaws).
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is common knowledge in the IT community. 14 Paradoxically, while
Moore’s Law led to cheap computing power, which allowed for increased
software complexity (i.e., lines of code, and consequently, the number of
instructions that can be carried out), software quality has apparently
declined.15 Thus, presently, the pace at which coding errors are fixed and
new code developed is about the same.16 Software design and coding
flaws may be due, in part, to the increasing modularization of software
development17 via, for example, service-oriented architecture (“SOA”)18,
and the increased reliance on agile development methods.19 Buyers may
not demand high-quality software when purchased because updates and
patches automatically push to software purchasers via the web.
While security software may not be as complex as operating systems
(the latter containing a fair amount of security-related as well as
functional features),20 security software suffers from similar weaknesses
and is prone to similar vulnerabilities. For example, antivirus software,

14. Vulnerability
Type
Distributions
in
CVE,
NVD,
https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/statistics-results?adv_search=true&cves=on&cvss_version=3
(last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
15. Moore’s Law states that “[t]he number of transistors incorporated in a chip will
approximately double every 24 months.” Arnab Hazari, Electronics Are About to Reach Their
Limit in Processing Power—but There Is a Solution, QUARTZ (Jan. 6, 2017),
https://qz.com/852770/theres-a-limit-to-how-small-we-can-make-transistors-but-the-solution-isphotonic-chips/ (quoting Gordon Moore, Intel cofounder).
16. Verizon’s
2016
Data
Breach
Investigations
Report,
VERIZON,
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/verizon-insights-lab/dbir/2016/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2017)
[hereinafter Verizon’s Report].
17. Historically, software was written in-house which led to the creation of information silos—
isolated applications with no common interfaces to share data with other packages. In contrast,
modern-day software is designed with interoperability in mind, which basically means that it takes
advantage of common interfaces to share data. Thus, a larger IT infrastructure can be built from
building blocks coming from different vendors.
18. Service-oriented architecture (“SOA”) is a methodology in which applications rely on the
World Wide Web and other such services available in a network. Implementing SOA “can involve
developing applications that use services, making applications available as services so that other
applications can use those services, or both.” Ed Ort, Service-Oriented Architecture and Web
Services:
Concepts,
Technologies,
and
Tools,
ORACLE
(Apr.
2005),
http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/articles/javase/soaterms-138190.html#soaterms.
19. Agile methods differ from traditional waterfall methods in that they favor iterative software
design cycles. Such an approach tends to be more suitable for projects where the requirements are
characterized by high volatility. Barry Boehm, Get Ready For Agile Methods, With Care,
COMPUTER, Jan. 2002, at 64, 66.
20. Several categories of metrics for “complexity” exist. McCabe’s cyclomatic complexity and
Halstead metrics are among the most widely recognized. The former is based on the control of
flow of the application. The latter uses program size and effort to evaluate measures like number
of operators, operands, etc. ADITYA P. MATHUR, FOUNDATIONS OF SOFTWARE TESTING 29–30
(2008). In addition, simpler measures like source lines of code (“SLOC”) may also be used to
measure the complexity of a program.
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as identified by vendors listed in the Cybersecurity 500 ranking,21 is
susceptible to a number of vulnerability categories, including bypassing
access control and permissions, privilege elevation, denial of service
(e.g., resource management errors and buffer overflow), code injections
and execution, memory corruption, and others.22 The more complex the
software package, the greater the number of vulnerabilities. To make
matters worse, different products can suffer from the exact same
vulnerability, such that one type of hack can exploit all products
simultaneously.23 Notwithstanding the expenditure of an extraordinary
amount of resources to prevent compromise, data comprised of millions
of customer records containing personal information housed by a
company (e.g., social security and credit card numbers, other financial
information, and medical records) and confidential business information
are still insecure.24
Hackers exploit that insecurity to steal or compromise the data.25
Intentional hacking is by far the most common cause of stolen or
compromised data.26 Today, hacking is a lucrative business carried out
by well-trained cybercriminals with malicious intent to exploit data for
potentially enormous amounts of money. It is estimated that external
actors—the majority of whom are motivated by direct or indirect
financial gain—cause roughly 80 percent of data breaches.27 Other
motives, such as revenge, entertainment, or ideology, rarely play a role.28
Personal information about individuals, such as names and addresses,
may sell for as much as three dollars on the Dark Web (i.e., the
21. Cybersecurity
500,
CYBERSECURITY
VENTURES,
http://cybersecurityventures.com/cybersecurity-500/ (last visited May 6, 2017). Some common
vendors include: Avast Software, ESET, Malwarebytes, McAfee, Kaspersky, Symantec, etc.
Windows
Anti-Malware
Market
Share
Reports,
METADEFENDER,
https://www.metadefender.com/stats/anti-malware-market-share-report#!/?date=2017-02-27 (last
visited May 6, 2017).
22. Vulnerabilities by Type, CVE DETAILS, http://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerabilities-bytypes.php (last visited May 6, 2017).
23. For example, in 2012, it was discovered that specially crafted archive files could fly under
the radar and avoid malware detection by several major antivirus products on the market. CVE2012-1459 Detail, NVD, https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-1459 (last
visited May 6, 2017).
24. See infra notes 29–44 (recognizing personal information's high price tag).
25. See generally Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011 (2014)
(discussing various approaches to mitigating cyberattacks).
26. Data Breaches, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/databreach (last visited May 6, 2017) (reflecting that more than 70 percent of record breaches were due
to hacking or “unknown”). Other culprits include insiders and lost or stolen data storage devices,
among others. Marian K. Riedy & Bartlomiej Hanus, Yes, Your Personal Data Is at Risk: Get Over
It!, 19 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3, 12–13 (2016).
27. Verizon’s Report, supra note 16.
28. Id.
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underground Internet),29 and social security numbers sell for a dollar.30
The price of financial information, such as credit card numbers and
PayPal or eBay account credentials, ranges from one to eighty dollars per
record. The Dark Web markets where stolen data is bought and sold are
often quite sophisticated. For example, those with a well-established
reputation actually have a return policy, which allows the buyers to
receive a refund if the purchased information is no longer active (i.e., a
credit card has been blocked or login credentials have been changed or
removed).31
All this stolen data can add up to a substantial profit. For example,
three hackers caught and charged with, inter alia, committing securities
fraud on individuals whose identities were stolen from JPMorgan Chase
allegedly made hundreds of millions of dollars.32
This potential profit begets an astonishing number of data breaches and
a massive number of corrupted files. It has been estimated that
approximately one in five organizations will likely suffer from a material
data breach in the next two years.33 In January 2015, cybersecurity firm
FireEye reported that 96 percent of the 1,600 computer networks that it
monitored were breached in 2014.34 Many of the big data breaches made
headline news. For example, it is widely known that in 2014, North
Korean hackers compromised Sony’s computers and databases.35 In the
process, the hackers destroyed the company’s servers and personal
computers and wiped Sony’s databases clean, resulting in a temporary
disruption of business functions.36 Millions of customer records
29. Follow the Data: Dissecting Data Breaches and Debunking the Myths, TREND MICRO
(Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/follow-thedata. A related source of illicit revenue, but not one specifically addressed herein, is the black
market for information regarding software vulnerabilities—avenues for data theft—including the
sale of information regarding so-called “zero day” attacks. Bambauer, supra note 25, at 1078.
30. Don Reisinger, Here’s How Much Your Social Security Number Is Worth on the Dark Web,
FORTUNE (Aug. 3, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/03/social-security-dark-web/.
31. Omri Toppol, The Industrialization of the Underground Economy, BLOGDOG (Apr. 7,
2015), https://getlogdog.com/blogdog/the-industrialization-of-the-underground-economy/.
32. Aarti Shahani, 3 Charged in Hacking Case Against JPMorgan Chase, 11 Other Firms, NPR
(Nov. 11, 2015, 5:07 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/11/11/455577683/3-charged-in-hackingcase-against-jpmorgan-chase-11-other-firms.
33. ONLINE TRUST ALLIANCE, 2015 DATA PROTECTION & BREACH READINESS GUIDE 6 (Feb.
13, 2015), https://otalliance.org/system/files/files/resource/documents/dpd_2015_guide.pdf.
34. FIREEYE, MAGINOT REVISITED: MORE REAL-WORLD RESULTS FROM REAL-WORLD
TESTS 3 (2015), https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-maginot-revisited.pdf.
35. It was widely rumored, if not proven, that hackers targeted Sony because of Sony’s pending
release of a comedy show about the assassination of the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-Un. Ari
Shapiro, Sony CEO Reflects on Immobilizing Cyberattack 1 Year Later, NPR (Nov. 20, 2015, 5:59
PM),
http://www.npr.org/2015/11/20/456831542/sony-ceo-reflects-on-immobilizing-cyberattack-1-year-later.
36. Id.

12_RIEDY (1099-1134).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

It Is Just Unfair

6/2/2017 11:10 AM

1105

containing personal information were allegedly compromised,37 as were
personnel records dating back over a decade.38 The hack of JPMorgan in
2015 resulted in the compromise of some seventy-six million client
records containing personal and financial information.39 Overall, in 2015
alone, hundreds of millions of data records housed in the databases and
systems of American businesses were hacked,40 and the numbers climbed
even higher in 2016.41 Government databases are, of course, another
target for hackers. In June 2015, the Office of Personnel Management
reported that hackers stole the background investigation records of an
estimated 21.5 million current, former, and prospective federal
employees.42 These examples are from data breaches that were reported
and confirmed, but the overall universe of data compromise is
undoubtedly much larger.
The security software systems installed to protect against unauthorized
data disclosure did not detect these breaches. Instead, either law
enforcement agencies or other third-party entities unrelated to the
breached organization discovered about 80 percent of breaches.43
The total cost of all this data compromise may be impossible to
calculate, but from some specific examples and industry surveys, one can
reasonably conclude that hacking exacts a steep price from businesses
and consumers. In one case alone, Target, which suffered a massive data
breach in 2013,44 reportedly lost a total of about $236 million in breachrelated costs,45 pledged to spend $100 million upgrading its security,46
and spent additional money defending against lawsuits brought on behalf
of its 110 million customers whose credit and debit card information had
been stolen47 and by banks and credit unions that incurred costs replacing
37. In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942,
955 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
38. Elena Kvochko & Rajiv Pant, Why Data Breaches Don’t Hurt Stock Prices, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Mar. 31, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/03/why-data-breaches-dont-hurt-stock-prices.
39. Shahani, supra note 32.
40. David McCandless, World’s Biggest Data Breaches, INFO. IS BEAUTIFUL,
http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks
(last
updated Apr. 25, 2017).
41. Paul Ausick, 2016 Data Breaches 10% Higher Than a Year Ago, 24/7 WALL STREET (Apr.
21, 2016. 8:50 AM), http://247wallst.com/technology-3/2016/04/21/2016-data-breaches-10higher-than-a-year-ago/.
42. Cybersecurity
Resource
Center:
Cybersecurity
Incidents,
OPM.GOV
https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/ (last visited May 6, 2017).
43. Verizon’s Report, supra note 16.
44. In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1157 (D. Minn.
2014).
45. Kvochko & Pant, supra note 38.
46. In re Target, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1157.
47. Id. at 1157.
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those cards and otherwise remediating the results of the breach.48 Sony
reportedly spent $53 million after its 2014 breach just in repairing its IT
and financial systems.49
The greater the number of records
compromised, the greater the cost of remediating the breach. But, on
average, the cost to any American company is estimated to be $7
million.50
Not every hack will be so costly to the breached company because
insurance may cover some of the out-of-pocket losses,51 and the net cost
may be but a small percentage of the company’s revenues.52 But overall,
companies spend billions of dollars dealing with the consequences of data
breaches.53 Consumers will presumably pay some portion of this cost as
companies pass data breach remediation expenses into the price of goods
and services, and consumers also incur costs directly as a result of the
breach. One analysis found that consumers spent $13.3 billion in losses
between 2005 and 2011,54 and $13.1 billion in 2013 alone,55 resulting
from illegal purchases from stolen credit and debit cards,56 lost time and
money correcting account information, and other additional costs
necessary to remediate the misuse of personal information.57
If all this money and time spent replacing computers, databases, and
credit cards are not bad enough, the prospect of more pervasive and more
dangerous consequences from data breaches in the future ought to give
one pause. For individuals, consider all the personal data that is
48. Kvochko & Pant, supra note 38.
49. Shapiro, supra note 35.
50. 2016 Ponemon Cost of Data Breach Study: United States, IBM, http://www03.ibm.com/security/data-breach/ (last visited May 6, 2017).
51. Daniel Garrie & Michael Mann, Cyber-Security Insurance: Navigating the Landscape of a
Growing Field, 31 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 379, 384 (2014) (noting that
cybersecurity insurance is the “fastest growing segment of the industry”). Of course, insuring
against the risk of a cyberattack is also a cost to the company: premiums for cybersecurity insurance
totaled $1.3 billion in 2013. Id.
52. Robert Hackett, How Much Do Data Breaches Cost Big Companies? Shockingly Little,
FORTUNE (Mar. 27, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/03/27/how-much-do-data-breaches-actuallycost-big-companies-shockingly-little/.
53. 2015 Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis, IBM, http://www01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgibin/ssialias?infotype=SA&subtype=WH&htmlfid=SEW03053WWEN (last visited May 6, 2017).
54. LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, IDENTITY THEFT REPORTED BY HOUSEHOLDS, 2005–2010, at 5 (Nov. 2011),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/itrh0510.pdf.
55. Al Pascual, 2013 Identity Fraud Report: Data Breaches Becoming a Treasure Trove for
Fraudsters, JAVELIN (Feb. 20, 2013), https://www.javelinstrategy.com/coverage-area/2013identity-fraud-report-data-breaches-becoming-treasure-trove-fraudsters.
56. Erika Harrell, Victims of Identity Theft, 2014, BUREAU JUST. STAT. (Sept. 27, 2015),
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5410.
57. Id.
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increasingly becoming available from “smart” homes and devices linked
to the Internet. This “Internet of Things” (“IoT”), or “ubiquitous
computing,”58 is still in its infancy, but growing rapidly. “Over the past
few years, practically every household item within reach has been
technologically upgraded and rendered ‘smart’: toothbrushes, cutlery,
baby monitors, refrigerators, thermostats, slow cookers, sprinkler
systems, sex toys, even the locks in doors.”59 The makers of the smart
devices collect and store that data.60 Where we go, what we want, and
what we do is all transmitted to company databases via Siri and Alexa.61
Given that present-day devices belonging to the IoT family are still in
their infancy, little doubt remains that new vulnerabilities will emerge
and be exploited.62
What hackers could do with this data is anyone’s guess, but a home
break-in and serious blackmail come to mind, as does true identity theft—
not just an illicit charge or two on a credit card—or the devices
themselves could be turned against individuals. For example, if a hacker
compromises a car’s control system, that car could come to an abrupt stop
on a busy freeway.63 For a business, consider the possibility of a Stuxnetlike64 attack in which commercial operations are hijacked and altered in
ways imperceptible to and undetectable by the company, and which have
the effect of reducing the company’s competitive edge and ultimately,
perhaps, its very survival.65
58. UBIQUITOUS
COMPUTING
(Mar.
17,
1996,
8:00
PM),
http://www.ubiq.com/hypertext/weiser/UbiHome.html (last visited May 6, 2017).
59. Jacob Silverman, Just How ‘Smart’ Do You Want Your Blender to Be?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(June 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/19/magazine/just-how-smart-do-you-wantyour-blender-to-be.html.
60. Id.
61. Id. Such “personal assistants” respond to voice commands to access digital connections,
including the internet and applications on computers and mobile devices.
62. Press Release, Gartner, Gartner’s 2015 Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies Identifies
the Computing Innovations That Organizations Should Monitor (Aug. 18, 2015),
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3114217.
63. Brenda Craig, First Car-Hacking Class Action Filed Against Ford, GM, and Toyota,
LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM
(July
25,
2015,
10:30
AM),
http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/articles/data-breach/interview-internet-lawyerstechnology-lawyer-2-20800.html#.VjJKfUauzTp.
64. Kim Zetter, How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in
History, WIRED (July 11, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/07/howdigital-detectives-deciphered-stuxnet/all/1. In short, Stuxnet is a piece of malware affecting
industrial control systems deployed over large industrial facilities. It allows the perpetrator to take
control of such systems without authorization. The prevailing rumor is that it was a result of
cooperation of the United States and Israeli governments targeting Iranian nuclear power plants
(until it got out of control).
65. Threats to national security from terrorist or “rogue” government attacks are, of course,
perhaps of even greater concern. How best to safeguard data housed and used by government
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It is probably just a fact of a heavily digitized life that data cannot be
made completely secure from unauthorized access. No software (other
than perhaps the simplest of software) can feasibly be error free,66 and so
long as these crimes pay, hackers will search for and exploit those
errors.67 But in general, society has reached a consensus that the number
and extent of data breaches can and should be reduced.68
One of the many legal measures aimed at improving data security69
that legal scholars propose focuses on the particular issue of software
vendors’ limited responsibility for security vulnerabilities in the massmarket products they sell.70 As discussed in more detail below, vendors
of consumer software, in particular, almost universally shield themselves
from liability in the event of a data breach through disclaimers in the sale
or license agreement, thereby eliminating the threat of litigation as an
agencies is beyond the scope of this Article.
66. Bambauer, supra note 4, at 844.
67. E.g., Trevor Ford, Cybersecurity Legislation for an Evolving World, 50 U.S.F.L. REV. 119,
121 (2016) (“Currently, both nation-state and criminal actors are conducting elaborate and
persistent campaigns to compromise the security of their targets . . . .”).
68. To that end, for example, in regard to the security of consumer data only, Congress and the
states regularly consider new legislation designed to ensure consumer privacy and protect personal
information stored in company databases. E.g., Natasha Singer, White House Proposes Broad
Consumer
Data
Privacy
Bill,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
27,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/28/business/white-house-proposes-broad-consumer-dataprivacy-bill.html?_r=0 (discussing recent proposed legislation that would provide Americans with
greater control over companies’ access to their personal information). Regulators also propose new
rules, standards, and guidance. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPUT. CRIME &
INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., Best Practices for Victim Response and Reporting
of
Cyber
Incidents
(2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/speeches/attachments/2015/04/29/criminal_divisio
n_guidance_on_best_practices_for_victim_response_and_reporting_cyber_incidents.pdf
(suggesting steps to take before, during, and after a cyber intrusion).
69. It would surely be impossible even to summarize all of these, given that hundreds, if not
thousands, of scholarly articles have been published on the general topic of data security.
70. E.g., T. Randolph Beard et al., Tort Liability for Software Developers: A Law & Economics
Perspective, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 199, 230–31 (2009) (discussing certain
aspects of the consumer’s experience with software that are within the consumer’s control rather
than the seller’s); Michael A. Cusumano, Who Is Liable for Bugs and Security Flaws in Software,
47
COMM.
ACM
25,
26
(Mar.
2004),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4fa3/39da13b3fe84062778af73ed688ffc25bd20.pdf;
Gilstrap,
supra note 12, at 1272–73 (explaining that despite increasing potential liabilities associated with
security breaches, software licensing agreements between vendors and businesses continue to limit
vendors’ liabilities); Oriola, supra note 3, a 514–16; Pinkney, supra note 4, at 46 (stating that the
government has more than once protected software manufacturers from liability for harm caused
by software failure); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement
of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1558 (2005) (explaining that “those responsible for
securing our personal data are rarely the ones who pay the cost of securing it”); Michael D. Scott,
Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come? 67 MD. L. REV. 425,
432–33 (2008) (listing the lack of significant risks to vendors in distributing insecure software as
one reason why certain software is insecure).
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incentive to produce better software.71 But legal scholarship has paid less
attention to this commercial market for security software and systems.72
This Article attempts to fill that gap and its empirical analysis of an enduser license agreement (“EULA”) (i.e., an agreement between the
software vendor or developer and the software user) for such security
systems demonstrates a similar liability shield in the contractual terms.
On the face of these license agreements, the commercial user—the
company that purchases the security software—bears the risk of loss in
the event of a data breach. This contractual allocation of risk may be a
perfectly reasonable choice for the licensee, for it can insure against that
risk.73 But to the extent the lack of accountability on the part of security
software vendors undermines the goal of data security, this scenario
should be unacceptable to the millions of consumers whose sensitive
personal information, housed by the purchasers of commercial security
systems, is consequently more vulnerable to theft and misuse.74
This Article proposes, as a solution, that the evolving role of consumer
protection agencies in promoting information security can, and should,
include a specific focus on commercial-security software. The Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”), in particular, has authority to protect
consumers from “unfair” or “deceptive” conduct related to data
security.75 In regard to protecting data against unauthorized disclosure,
the FTC mostly targets companies that fail to employ reasonable data
security measures.76 These failures, the FTC alleges, create a “substantial
risk of harm” to consumers and constitute an “unfair trade practice.”77 A
vulnerability in the security software used by a company to protect
against data disclosure can also pose a “substantial risk of harm” to the
consumers whose data is housed by that company, unless that
vulnerability is detected and quickly patched.
This Article proposes, then, that regulators take the following

71. See infra Part I.A. (The “Unusual” Legal Cocoon Woven by Software Vendors).
72. Gilstrap’s scholarship, for example, aims at security software, but not, specifically, the
commercial market for such software. Gilstrap, supra note 12, at 1273.
73. See generally Garrie & Mann, supra note 51 (discussing the growing importance of
cybersecurity insurance and related issues).
74. This is, of course, the classic “externalities” problem. See Bambauer, supra note 25, at 1030
(“Insecure [IT] users and providers do not suffer the full costs of the harms they generate.”).
75. See generally Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Data Security and the FTC’s UnCommon Law, 101
IOWA L. REV. 955, 963–66 (2016) (describing the common law approach of the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”)).
76. Id. at 957–58.
77. Amanda R. Moncada, When a Data Breach Comes-a-Knockin’, the FTC Comes A-Blockin’:
Extending the FTC’s Authority to Cover Data-Security Breaches, 64 DEPAUL L. REV 911, 919
(2015).
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position:78 if a commercial security software vendor knows or should
have known of a vulnerability in its software, it could be subject to an
“unfair” or “deceptive” trade practice claim if the vendor does not notify
all of its licensees of that defect.79 This proposal—a new take on “caveat
emptor”—accomplishes at least two important objectives. First, it
encourages information exchange, a strategy which is increasingly
promoted as an effective weapon against cybercrime.80 Not all software
vulnerabilities would create such a significant risk of harm that the failure
to disclose would qualify as an “unfair trade practice,” but the risk of such
a charge would presumably incentivize vendors to share vulnerabilities
information. Second, to the extent commercial licensees are bound by
contractual limitations on holding security software vendors accountable
by filing suit, or are simply unwilling to bear the cost of litigation,
regulatory agencies and consumers could step in and recover for the
breach. Though new parties could recover for the breach, this limited
definition of “unfair trade practice” would not unleash the floodgates to
litigation and would account for the fact that software cannot be made
wholly “secure.” And surely the failure to disclose a known vulnerability
would meet anyone’s definition of “unfair.”
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I begins with a discussion
regarding the prevailing and persistent problem of software vendor
immunity from responsibility for security failures, and proposed
solutions. What follows is a summary, in broad strokes, of the
functionality of a specific subset of software: commercial data security
systems. This Article next describes its empirical analysis of commercial
security software license agreements and observations regarding the
respective liability of licensor and licensee in the event of a data breach,
and discusses the reasons commercial buyers seem either unable or
unwilling to hold the vendors responsible. Part II turns to this Article’s
proposal for breaking this impasse. First, it explains how encouraging
“buyer beware” notifications fits well with the current legal trend
promoting information exchange to combat cybercrime. Second, it
discusses the FTC’s current and evolving role in cybersecurity, explains
why that role can readily encompass the regulation of commercial
78. Whether this position should be taken through rulemaking, or through “common law”
development or other administrative means is beyond the scope of this Article.
79. Michael D. Scott proposes that the FTC can and should use its authority to take action
against “unfair and deceptive trade practices” to prosecute vendors who distribute “insecure”
software. Scott, supra note 70, at 482–83. The proposal herein is more specific and targeted—
avoiding various troublesome issues such as defining “insecure”—and is based on a differing set
of observations and arguments, including this Article’s empirical analysis of commercial EULAs.
80. See generally Ford, supra note 67 (discussing the increase in frequency and sophistication
of cyberattacks); see infra Part II.A. (discussing information sharing as a data-security measure).
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software vendors who fail to notify of a vulnerability, and notes how state
trade laws might also come into play. Third, it discusses why, in this
context, targeted regulation with a limited option for private litigation is
a better option than a pure liability regime.
I. DISCLAIMING RESPONSIBILITY
As this Part summarizes, scholars have well documented the fact that
software vendors almost universally shield themselves from liability in
the event of a breach of contract. One might expect, however, that in the
commercial market for software and, in particular, for security software,
a different pattern would emerge. Sophisticated companies purchasing
billions of dollars of software and services to secure data would surely
demand that the vendors of that software and those services share in the
responsibility in the event of a data breach. But this Article’s empirical
analysis suggests otherwise.
A. The “Unusual”81 Legal Cocoon Woven by Software Vendors
As has been observed through both qualitative82 and empirical
research,83 software vendors almost universally employ standard form
contract terms that disclaim warranties and limit liability in the event the
software fails, resulting in a security breach.84 Courts generally uphold
contractual disclaimers of express and implied warranties in software
license agreements.85 Though a contractual disclaimer may be
81. Bambauer, supra note 25, at 1034 (referring to the prevailing use of contractual limitations
on liability in software licenses).
82. E.g., Michael L. Rustad, Making UCITA More Consumer-Friendly, 18 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 547, 579 (1999) (“One can read hundreds of click-wrap, Web site, shrinkwrap, and other mass-market transactions and have yet to find a single example of a software
licensor willing to provide any warranty for its software.”).
83. An analysis of standard form contracts licensing dozens of different types of software
demonstrated that 90 percent disclaimed implied warranties and 89 percent disclaimed liability for
consequential damages. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a Standard Form Contract? An
Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 677, 703 (Dec.
2007). Express warranties were generally limited to conformance to specifications. Id. at 697. See
also Robert J. Hillman & Ibrahim Barakat, Warranties and Disclaimers in the Electronic Age, 11
YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (2008–2009) (presenting empirical evidence of widespread use of
disclaimers in consumer software license agreements).
84. See generally Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 81 (analyzing standard form contracts in
software license agreements to document the prevalence of terms such as license scope and
warranties); Rustad, supra note 82 (explaining the importance of the Uniform Computer
Information Transaction Act, the statute which, among other things, enables expanding commercial
practice in computer information transactions by commercial usage and agreement of the parties);
Scott, supra note 70 (exploring why software vendors are not being held liable for distributing
insecure code and why current laws regarding negligence and product liability do not concern
insecure software).
85. Scott, supra note 70, at 437.
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unenforceable because of fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations
made by the vendor regarding the software’s expected performance,86
courts are generally reluctant to disregard a clear limitation of warranty
in the terms of the contract.87 The limited type of express warranty that
is commonly found in the standard EULA is so “content-less” that, as one
scholar observed, “[n]o reported decision has unequivocally held that a
software vendor has breached an express warranty.”88 Though an
“unconscionable” disclaimer may be unenforceable,89 courts generally
enforce limitations on liability in software license agreements90 and
infrequently find this exception applicable in the commercial context.91
In a few jurisdictions the “failure of essential purpose” doctrine may be
effective in overcoming a limitation of liability clause. 92 But for the most
part, purchasers or licensees have no contractual recourse against the
software vendor in the event of security failures.93

86. See, e.g., J.C. Whitney & Co. v. Renaissance Software Corp., No. 99 C 3714, 2000 WL
556610, at *9–10 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2000) (denying a motion to dismiss based on disclaimer when
the plaintiff sufficiently pled facts supporting fraud in the inducement claim).
87. E.g., Lincoln Sav. Bank v. Open Solutions, Inc., No. C12-2070, 2013 WL 997894, at *3–5
(N.D. Iowa Mar. 13, 2013).
88. Scott, supra note 70, at 437.
89. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2004).
90. Bambauer, supra note 25, at 1034 (“End-user license agreements typically disclaim all
liability on the vendor’s part, and tort law has failed to impose a duty of care on software
manufacturers.”).
91. Scott, supra note 70, at 438.
92. See generally Gilstrap, supra note 12 (arguing that licensing agreements between vendors
and businesses restrict vendors’ liabilities, which allow them to avoid the liability following a
security breach).
93. It has been noted that software vendors are effectively using the “risk allocation provisions
of the [Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”)]” to shift liability for software failures to the users in
the EULAs. Scott, supra note 70, at 427. Some, and perhaps the majority of courts apply the UCC
to software transactions. E.g., Holly K. Towle, Enough Already: It Is Time to Acknowledge That
UCC Article 2 Does Not Apply to Software and Other Information, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 531, 552–
53 (2011) (explaining courts’ evolution in applying article 2 of the UCC to software transactions).
But many do not. E.g., Lamle v. Mattel, Inc., 394 F.3d 1355, 1359 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (vacating
the district court’s grant of summary judgment on a claim against a licensing agreement for a board
game); Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same);
Attachmate Corp. v. Health Net, Inc., No. C09-1161 MJP, 2010 WL 4365833, at *2 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 26, 2010) (same). The emerging trend seems to be to consider the issue as being fact specific.
Gabriela Rojas-Lozano v. Google, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1108–09 (N.D. Cal. 2016). Whether
the UCC applies may be determinative in regard to various contract law issues. E.g., Lorin
Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 459, 465–66
(2000) (illustrating that the usual image of a software transaction as a customer who purchases prepackaged software from a retail store falls within a “sale of goods” within article 2 of the UCC).
But regarding risk-allocation provisions, it appears the distinction makes little difference. At
common law, limitations of damages provisions, particularly a provision precluding recovery for
consequential damages, in commercial contracts are generally enforceable, as are limitations on
warranties.
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These provisions pose a formidable obstacle against breach of contract
liability in the event a hacker breaches a vulnerability in the software and
compromises the user’s data.94 The lack of significant legal risk in the
event of a security breach is one of the reasons insecure software is sold.95
The solution, according to many scholars, is to mold traditional tort and
contract law principles in such a way that software vendors can be held
accountable notwithstanding the contractual disclaimers.96 As most of
these same scholars acknowledge, however, recovery based on a tortbased claim would encounter many, perhaps insurmountable problems,
including, inter alia, the economic loss rule, which, in many jurisdictions,
precludes recovery in tort where the injury does not produce pecuniary
damages and there is no claim for physical injury, death, or other property
damages.97 And contractual limitations on liability are generally
94. See generally Gilstrap, supra note 12 (arguing that licensing agreements between vendors
and businesses restrict vendors’ liabilities, which allow them to avoid the liability following a
security breach).
95. Scott, supra note 70, at 433 (exploring why software vendors are not being held liable for
distributing insecure code and why current laws regarding negligence and product liability do not
concern insecure software). There are other reasons, of course, including the cost and complexity
of producing “error-free” code, as discussed above.
96. E.g., Gilstrap, supra note 12, at 1280 (arguing for a broader adoption of the “failure of
essential purpose” doctrine of contract law); Pinkney, supra note 5, at 69 (analyzing possible tort
remedies); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Cybersecurity Policy: Extending Learned
Hand’s Negligence Formula to Information Security Breaches, 3 ISJLP 237, 239 (2007) (“We
argue that companies have a duty to provide reasonable information security practices under the
common law of torts.”); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 70, at 239; Scott, supra note 70, at 441
(analyzing opportunities and barriers to the assertion of various tort claims); Daniel M. White, The
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002: A Potemkin Village, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
369, 401 (2010) (arguing that government purchasers should demand “real” warranties from
software vendors); Frances E. Zollers et al., No More Soft Landings for Software: Liability for
Defects in an Industry That Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
745, 746 (2005) (“[W]e argue for the adoption of a strict liability regime for software failure that
produces physical injury and offer supporting arguments for why such a move is both necessary
and sensible.”). Aside from these private contractual issues, a related body of scholarship analyzes
whether and to what extent software should be regulated. E.g., Robert W. Hahn & Anne LayneFarrar, The Law and Economics of Software Security, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 296–97
(2006) (explaining that most software programs are intricate and interrelated sequences of code,
which create complex programs that might entice hackers); Peter Sloan, The Reasonable
Information Security Program, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, 25 (2014) (arguing that to establish a
reasonable information security program, an organization should consider applicable legal
requirements to implement security safeguards, including obligations to third-parties); David
Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 287, 294 (2014) (discussing
the efficacy of two modes of cybersecurity regulation using a mixed-methods empirical approach);
see generally Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319 (2005)
(exploring the increasing use of code and informational-technology architecture to deal with
societal issues and problems).
97. E.g., Scott, supra note 70, at 481 (“However, for the most common forms of injury caused
by defective security software—loss of sensitive corporate and third party data—the economic loss
rule will continue to bar most claims.”).
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enforceable.98 As a result of all this, “[t]o date, despite an epidemic of
computer security flaws, no plaintiff has recovered damages for
cybercrimes enabled by flawed software under either a contract theory or
under a tort theory.”99
Though scholars, such as Stephen Gilstrap, specifically address
security software, most scholarship regarding the lack of accountability
for insecure software generically concerns mere “software.”100 Much of
the data is drawn from consumer transactions.101 The analyses of the
reasons for the failure of the market to demand more secure software rest
on principles applicable primarily in the consumer, “mass-market”
setting.102 For reasons discussed in these scholarly articles, it is perhaps
not surprising that, in this particular market, the rule of caveat emptor
generally rules.
One might expect, by way of contrast, that in the commercial market
for software and, in particular, for security software, a different pattern
would emerge. Sophisticated companies that purchase billions of dollars
of software and services to secure data would surely demand that the
vendors of that software and those services themselves share in the
responsibility in the event of a data breach. But this Article’s empirical
analysis suggests otherwise.
B. Even More Unusual Commercial Security Software in the Same
Cocoon
Information security for the commercial market ranges from desktop
antivirus software used by a small law firm103—here overlapping with
the consumer market—to complex beasts including cybersecurity

98. E.g., id. at 437 (explaining that warranty disclaimers are presumed valid and construed
strictly in favor of the buyer).
99. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 70, at 1567; see also Kuwahara, supra note 6 (describing
Microsoft’s “Trust Worthy Computing Initiative” to improve the security of its operating systems).
100. Gilstrap, supra note 12.
101. E.g., Rustad, supra note 82, at 566. In Marotta-Wurgler’s empirical study, over half of the
standard form contracts were for “business” rather than consumer software, according to the author.
Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 83, at 689. But given that the average cost of all products in the data
set was $763, it does not appear that many of these contracts were for truly “commercial grade”
software products.
102. E.g., Bambauer, supra note 25, at 1033 (discussing the problem of externalities arising
from the insecure use of “her” computer); Oriola, supra note 3, at 468 (arguing that the market can
and does demand more secure software, using steps taken by Microsoft to reduce vulnerabilities in
its Windows operating system as an example); Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Vulnerable
Software: Product-Risk Norms and the Problem of Unauthorized Access, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
& POL’Y 45, 70–71 (discussing “Alice” and her decision regarding the purchase of secure versus
insecure software).
103. This observation is based on the Authors’ experience.
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auditing services, data mining and analytics,104 and various “proactive”
measures intended to quickly detect and respond to attempted attacks
such as software and hardware firewalls and intrusion detection and/or
prevention systems.105 Data security systems also include measures for
“patching” leaks106 and for otherwise minimizing the damage if a breach
occurs.107 The more complex data security system packages include a
wide range of services including, inter alia, data security training108 and
various system and security support measures such as assistance in
installation, maintenance, analysis, and response to security threats. 109
As with anything having to do with data, however, at the core of most, if
not all, data security systems is software. Regardless of whether it is a
simple script, or a complex data transformation procedure, software
serves as the middleman between hardware and data. It handles the logic
of how data is being processed and controls the access to hardware
resources. Some information-security vendors offer software solutions
only and others deliver so-called security appliances, which are basically
dedicated stand-alone devices comprising of both hardware and
software.110
Notwithstanding the variety of functions security software performs,
the license agreements for that software are quite similar. The Authors
of this Article performed text mining on the EULAs posted on the
websites of close to 400 data security vendors, ranging from global
conglomerates with data security divisions111 to niche start-up
companies,112 which demonstrated a surprising similarity among the
104. E.g., Craig et al., supra note 7, at 758–59 (discussing a survey of industry practices to show
that more than 75 percent of firms offer data-mining, analytics, and detection systems).
105. See generally id. (explaining proactive cybersecurity measures to defend against
“Advanced Persistent Threats”).
106. E.g., Oriola, supra note 3, at 468 (arguing that a “find-and-corrective” patch strategy to
fend against unscrupulous groups or malicious hackers).
107. E.g., Bambauer, supra note 25, at 1054 (explaining that in the event of an attack or a
breach, using heterogeneous systems—like variegated code and hardware—as opposed to
homogenous systems cause fewer parts of that system to be affected).
108. Craig et al., supra note 7, at 760.
109. E.g., Services Overview, LOGRHYTHM, https://logrhythm.com/services/ (last visited Apr.
10, 2017) (offering security intelligence for private firms).
110. These devices offer features such as firewall, virtual private network (“VPN”), traffic
shaping, content filtering, intrusion detection, network connectivity, packet inspection, etc. In
essence, these are nothing other than specialized computers with a central processing unit, memory,
storage, etc., that are designed and optimized to perform specific tasks.
111. See, e.g., Cyber Solutions, LOCKHEED MARTIN, http://cyber.lockheedmartin.com/ (last
visited May 10, 2017) (offering cybersecurity for private firms).
112. See, e.g., Open Source Application Security, BLACK DUCK SOFTWARE,
https://www.blackducksoftware.com/solutions/application-security (last visited May 28, 2017)
(offering information security for private firms).

12_RIEDY (1099-1134).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1116

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

6/2/2017 11:10 AM

[Vol. 48

EULAs, and between these agreements and “mass market” consumer
software license agreements.
Text mining is a semiautomated process aimed at extracting patterns
from unstructured data sources, more specifically textual data.113 Some
of the most common applications of text mining include information
extraction, topic tracking, summarization, categorization, and clustering.
Like any analytical methodology, text mining follows a standardized
process. In general, this process can be broken down into three
sequentially organized steps: (1) establishing a corpus, (2) creating a
term-document matrix (“TDM”), and (3) extracting knowledge.114 Even
though these steps are organized serially, the reciprocal relationships
between them result in an iterative overall process. Before the TDM is
created, the documents are preprocessed (i.e., cleansed) to eliminate as
much “noise” from the documents as possible. The cleansing is iterative,
and requires subject-matter expertise to identify relevant and redundant
terms. The TDM relates the remaining terms to the documents based on
selected measures, such as the frequency with which the term appears in
the documents. The underlying assumption behind such an approach is
that these frequencies can be used to illustrate (i.e., summarize) the
essence of a given document.
The Authors of this Article obtained a corpus of 370 documents
extracted from the vendor sites (the set contained only documents that
were publicly available). The corpus contained a total of 1,444,017
words and 17,217 unique word forms. The EULAs varied in length from
170 words to almost 16,000 words. Because the documents significantly
varied in length, the Authors computed a vocabulary density (i.e., a
numerical value representing words commonly used in the documents in
the corpus).115 Here, the vocabulary density ranged from 0.120 to 0.571.
Although one would expect software license agreements to contain
common words because all contracts have core common elements (e.g.,
recitation of “consideration”), these figures demonstrate a very high
degree of commonality. The Authors then cleansed the corpus and
created the TDM by extracting the words “warranty,” and “liability,” and
case/number variations of these words.116
113. GABE IGNATOW & RADA MIHALCEA. TEXT MINING: A GUIDEBOOK FOR THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 4 (2016).
114. Dursun Delen & Martin D. Crossland, Seeding the Survey and Analysis of Research
Literature with Text Mining, 34 EXPERT SYSTEMS WITH APPLICATIONS 1707, 1711 (2008).
115. The number is obtained by dividing the total words by the unique words, which shows how
many words will occur, on average, before a new word is encountered. Zachary Booth Simpson,
Vocabulary
Analysis
of
Project
Gutenberg
(May
2000),
http://www.minecontrol.com/zack/guttenberg/.
116. Specifically, first, we split the documents into sequences of tokens, which were identified
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The TDM demonstrates the following regarding the warranty language
of the 370 EULAs: 60 percent (225 EULAs) contained an “as is” phrase,
including “as is and without warranty,” “as is basis without warranty,” or
“as is without warranty/ies of any kind.” 41 percent (152 EULAs)
specifically stated “no warranty/ies” or “makes/provides no warranty of
any kind.” In the fifty EULAs that provided a warranty, the vendor
guaranteed that the product “will perform substantially in accordance
with the documentation.” Almost half (177) of the EULAs, on the other
hand, explicitly stated that the licensed products were not “error free.”
66 percent (245 EULAs) limited the liability of the vendor in some
regard. In these 245 agreements, the seller confirmed that “in no event
shall/will [it] be liable” for various categories of damages. Specific
disclaimers that appeared frequently included liability disclaimers for
“loss of data” or “lost data” (145 EULAs), “loss of profits” or “lost
profits” (197 EULAs), and “interruption of business operations” (76
EULAs). The seller’s “entire liability” was often limited by the
agreement to an amount not exceeding the amount paid for the software
or services (171 EULAs).
On the face of these license agreements, then, the commercial user of
security systems commonly used “as is” software, therefore at risk for
bearing almost all costs—which, as discussed in the Introduction, can be
considerable—in the event the software fails and a data breach occurs.
And given the similarity of the EULAs’ low vocabulary density, one
could wonder how the buyer even knows what the phrase, “as is,” really
means. One would expect contracts or purchase orders for “massmarket” software, as with coffee pots or other standardized goods, to be
boilerplate: neither the seller nor the buyer needs additional, contractual
information to understand the nature of the exchange. This is also true
for many services, ranging from lawn care (e.g., the grass will be cut
when it reaches a certain height and buyer will pay a set fee) to a knee
replacement (e.g., the natural joint will be removed and replaced and the
insurance carrier billed for the surgeon’s fee). But given the complexity
with non-letter characters (e.g., spaces between the words). Second, we transformed all the
characters in our documents to lower case. Third, we filtered entity names (i.e., people,
organizations, places, etc.) from the documents. Fourth, we generated n-grams (with n set to 7)
from the document terms. An n-gram is essentially a series of consecutive tokens of length n,
which are used fully to capture the terms of interest, which are “delivered” in the n-gram. Fifth,
after creating the n-grams, we filtered the “stopwords” from our corpus. Stopwords are basically
words that occur so frequently in text and speech that individually they do not add any specific
meaning to the document, like “a.” These may, however, have significance in conjunction with
other terms, and that is why we created the n-grams first. The end product of these transformations
was a term occurrence matrix that listed the total term (words and n-grams) occurrences, as well as
document occurrences.
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and variability of a “security system,”117 and of each individual
company’s hardware, software, network, and business functions, it would
seem that both the seller and the buyer would need additional, contractual
language to effectuate a transparent exchange. Certainly, it is possible to
employ a simple, formulaic contract for the exchange of complicated
services. For example, a law firm retainer agreement is usually simple
and somewhat “boilerplate.” But the obligations and responsibilities of
the attorney to the client need not be spelled out in detail in the contract:
the applicable code of professional conduct contains a host of
performance obligations the attorney must follow, and which the client is
entitled to expect. The professional standard of care imposes its own set
of performance requirements. But no such extracontractual professional
standards exist in the security software world.118 Caveat emptor appears
to reign in this market, just as it does in the consumer market.
Of course, sophisticated commercial purchasers of enterprise security
software and systems do not necessarily enter into these “boilerplate”
license agreements. Some percentage of licensees surely negotiate more
favorable terms, including more robust warranty provisions. 119 But for
some reason—the disclaimers, limited warranties, limitations on
recoverable elements of damages, and indefinite contractual description
of expected performance in the EULAs being possible explanations—the
software vendors are not being held accountable in the event of a data
breach. Repeated searches of reported federal and state cases
demonstrate a curious dearth of lawsuits by companies120 against security
117. By “complexity,” we mean here the variety in infrastructure configurations. No two
corporate clients will have their computing infrastructure set up in the exact same way. The vendor
will have tested its software performance in various simulated environments, but it cannot expect
that the product will perform the exact same way in every environment. This complexity also
increases due to the rate by which technologies come and go: customers may have legacy
applications which are no longer compatible with current standards. In addition, as discussed
earlier, new vulnerabilities surface all the time, which often means the vendors need to modify their
products to accommodate for the new challenges. In short, security software functions in a
complicated and dynamic environment.
118. E.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 70, at 1590 (“It is theoretically possible that a software
engineer could be held liable for computer malpractice but, to date, no court has held that a software
engineer’s failure to develop reasonably secure software constituted professional negligence.”).
Note that the company buying the software, on the other hand, may be subject to specific, regulatory
standards for data security. Dana Rosenfeld & Donnelly McDowell, Moving Target: Protecting
Against Data Breaches Now and Down the Road, 28 ANTITRUST 90, 90–93 (2014).
119. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Transp. Sec. Solutions v. MTA Capital Const. Co., No. 09 Civ.
4077 (PGG), 09 Civ. 6033 (PGG), 2014 WL 12560686, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014)
(explaining that in a contract for the purchase of a $300 million security system for the New York
metropolitan area transportation system, Lockheed warranted, inter alia, to provide equipment and
software “fit for the MTA’s intended use” and “free from defects in design, material and
workmanship”).
120. Consumers seem somewhat more apt to seek compensation from their security software
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software and services vendors arising from a data security breach.121 The
occasional lawsuit between a purchaser and a security software vendor
involves, instead, a dispute about contractual obligations other than
securing data.122 One could wonder why companies, collectively
spending billions of dollars on security software and systems, are not
fighting back.
C. Commercial Licensors: Unable or Unwilling to Hold Vendors
Accountable?
Although identifying the many reasons any one company accepts the
status quo is an impossible task, some common themes can be discerned.
First, regarding those companies that accept the “boilerplate” terms
which effectively shield vendors from liability, this contractual allocation
of risk may, at first blush, seem to be a perfectly reasonable choice for
the licensee, for it can insure against that risk.123 But because of the
“unpredictable probability and costs” of data breach, cybersecurity
insurance is particularly expensive.124 Because if insured, the policy
premium may not come close to covering the entire loss to the

vendors when that software malfunctions in some way. See generally Boyd v. Avanquest N. Am.
Inc., No. 12-cv-04391-WHO, 2015 WL 4396137 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2015) (denying a software
manufacturer’s motion to dismiss a class action seeking damages from an alleged breach of
contract); Haskins v. Symantec Corp., No. 13-cv-0183-JST, 2013 WL 6234610 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2,
2013) (dismissing the plaintiff’s suit for false representations by a computer security software
manufacturer); Bilodeau v. McAfee, Inc., No. 12-CV-04589-LHK, 2013 WL 3200658 (N.D. Cal.
June 24, 2013) (granting the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint against a computer security
software manufacturer); Rottner v. AVG Technologies USA, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 222 (D. Mass.
2013) (granting a software manufacturer’s motion to dismiss a class action complaint claiming false
representation); Gross v. Symantec Corp., No. 12-00543 CRB, 2012 WL 3116158 (N.D. Cal. July
31, 2012) (granting a software manufacturers’ motion to dismiss a class action for fraudulent
inducement, express warranty, breach of contract, and breach of implied covenant).
121. The few, related cases found include National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Trustwave
Holdings, Inc., No. CN14C-10-160 MMJ (CCLD), 2016 WL 2354621 (Del. Super. Ct. May 3,
2016), in which the subrogee sued a qualified security assessor for allegedly failing to ensure
compliance with standard measures for securing credit card transactions, resulting in a breach, and
Cotton Patch Café, Inc., v. Micros Systems, No. MJG-09-3242, 2012 WL 5986773 (D. Md. Nov.
27, 2012), in which the defendant, vendor of Point-of-Sale systems to retailers, allegedly installed
a server containing malware which hackers used to access data.
122. See generally i.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass.
2002) (granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant, reasoning that the
plaintiff could not be awarded specific performance because the software was not irreplaceable);
Piper Jaffray & Co. v. SunGard Sys. Int’l, Inc., No. 04-2922 (RHK/JSM), 2004 WL 2222322 (D.
Minn. Sept. 30, 2004) (granting a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s breach of contract claims against
a software manufacturer).
123. See generally Garrie & Mann, supra note 51, at 385 (arguing that one of the difficulties
associated with the high costs of cybersecurity insurance is choosing between spending money on
cybersecurity insurance or investing in cybersecurity technology).
124. Id. at 384.
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company.125
Rather than insure against an uncertain risk, companies could negotiate
more favorable terms with security vendors, demanding meaningful
warranties and reallocations of the risk of loss. These are not, after all,
individual consumers buying Microsoft operating systems with security
flaws.126 Presumably, as a consequence, vendors would provide more
secure software, but this “better” software would come at a higher cost.127
In the end, however, companies may simply be unwilling to pay this
higher cost to ensure greater protection. Although the issue is a matter of
some debate,128 it would appear most observers believe companies
underspend on cybersecurity overall.129
Compounding the issue is the fact that, for any one business, the risk
of a large-scale data breach and resulting loss is small.130 If a breach
occurs, some portion of the loss to the company may be recouped through
insurance coverage.131 If the publicity of the breach causes a drop in the
company’s share price, that drop may be just temporary.132 The net cost
of the breach to the company may be a very small percentage of annual
revenues.133 Therefore, paying more for better security software is just
not worth the cost for companies.134
125. E.g., Hackett, supra note 52 (reporting information from Target’s financial statements
showing, for 2014, $191 million in losses caused by a data breach, offset by $46 million in
insurance receivable).
126. See generally Kuwahara, supra note 6 (discussing impediments to liability and proposing
various possible solutions).
127. Cf., Oriola, supra note 3, at 472 (arguing that the lack of a demand for more secure, and
presumably more costly, software in the consumer market is due, in part, to the fact that software
cannot be wholly secure).
128. Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1503, 1510
(2013).
129. Id. at 1511 (“Most observers believe that firms are underinvesting—and are missing the
mark by a wide margin.”).
130. Verizon’s Report, supra note 16. Similarly, in 2016, pursuant to IBM’s 2017 Cyber
Security Intelligence Index Report, more than 54 million “security events” were detected by the
clients’ systems or networks, whereas the average client experienced only ninety-three attacks out
of these events. 2017 IBM X-FORCE THREAT INTELLIGENCE INDEX, IMB SECURITY 3 (Mar.
2017), http://www-03.ibm.com/security/data-breach/cyber-security-index.html. In other words,
only a fraction of a percent of the total security events represents a significant level of severity.
131. Garrie & Mann, supra note 51, at 380–81 (arguing that cybersecurity coverage is needed
given the high cost of data breach). Thus, the risk allocation provisions of the EULA’s would be
acceptable: the buyer accepts the risk of loss and simply insures against it.
132. Kvochko & Pant, supra note 38 (illustrating the momentary stock declines of Home Depot,
Sony, Target, and Sears following a publicized data breach).
133. Hackett, supra note 52 (“From Sony to Target, big companies that were hacked felt barely
a dent to their bottom line.”).
134. The valuation exercise may be greatly compounded by the externalities problem: “The fact
that many costs of cyber-attacks are externalized is enormously significant.” Sales, supra note 128,
at 1526.

12_RIEDY (1099-1134).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

It Is Just Unfair

6/2/2017 11:10 AM

1121

In any event, similar to consumers, those companies bound to the same
types of vendor-protective licensees are unable to hold software vendors
accountable.
Contractual limitations on liability are generally
enforceable, particularly in commercial transactions. 135 As with claims
brought by individuals arising from data breach, tort claims by
commercial buyers would encounter many, perhaps insurmountable
problems, including, inter alia, the economic loss rule.136 In many
jurisdictions, the economic loss rule precludes recovery in tort where the
injury is pecuniary and no claim exists for physical injury, death, or other
property damages.
Even when a data breach occurred and the company that experienced
the breach is not precluded by contract from seeking damages from a
security vendor, realistically identifying that vendor as a culpable party
to the breach is beset with a number of technical and legal difficulties.
On the technical side, for the company to even investigate whether the
breach may have implicated a specific software is often a trial-and-error
game. Some evidence of what occurred can be collected through digital
forensics, but only if the attackers have not removed all the traces of their
activity by, for example, wiping the system event logs. But even if there
is clear evidence that the attack came through a specific software
package, the company itself can usually only examine the binaries of a
given piece of software because the software is commonly purchased and
installed in proprietary, closed-source code. In other words, symptoms
of a suspected vulnerability may be detectable, but only the vendor can
identify the root cause because it is hidden behind the code. In a
potentially adversarial situation, obtaining the vendor’s helpful
intervention seems unlikely.
From the legal point of view, proving “cause in fact” will prove
difficult because multiple access points to the data are likely 137 and
multiple intervening actions between the coding of the software and the
breach likely occurred.138 Proximate cause is also a very sticky
wicket,139 particularly given the difficulty of ascribing foreseeability to
the consequences of any particular software error. It might be reasonably
135. E.g., Scott, supra note 70, at 437 (explaining that warranty disclaimers are presumed valid
and construed strictly in favor of the buyer).
136. Id. at 481 (“However, for the most common forms of injury caused by defective security
software—loss of sensitive corporate and third party data—the economic loss rule will continue to
bar most claims.”).
137. E.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 70, at 252 (arguing that most data disasters have
occurred because of weak access controls in “the terrestrial world” rather than through hacking in
cyberspace).
138. Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 96, at 316.
139. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 70, at 1602.
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foreseeable that a breach might occur, given what is widely known about
cybercrime today,140 but the industry knows very little about what
cybercriminals do with all the purloined data unless a criminal
investigation brings it to light in a particular case.141 Thus, defining what
damages are “reasonably foreseeable” is problematic: “Even if the
plaintiff establishes actual cause, there may not be recovery if the causal
relationship between the defendant’s breach and the plaintiff’s losses is
too remote.”142
Despite all these hurdles, one would presume that if the lack of data
security were untenable, sophisticated commercial buyers would take
action. Buyers would demand favorable contract terms, notwithstanding
some price increase, or corporate counsel would have brought viable
claims in court (e.g., claims of negligent misrepresentation or fraud by
nondisclosure),143 notwithstanding restrictive contract terms.
Sophisticated forensic experts would have identified software
vulnerabilities and opined, in court, that that particular defect was a cause
of the breach. Data would be more secure. But this hypothetical surely
does not look like the security world today.144
None of this is happening because, apparently, for any or all of the
reasons proposed above, the situation is tenable, insofar as business is
concerned. Unless some external force propels a change, there is little
reason to believe the commercial buyers are going to step up to the plate
and demand better security software. The consumers whose data those
companies house are therefore largely left out in the cold.145 It has been
observed: “The problem is that those responsible for securing our
personal data are rarely the ones who pay the cost of securing it and in
140. See generally Meiring de Villiers, Reasonable Foreseeability in Information Security Law:
A Forensic Analysis, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 149 (2008) (presenting an analysis of civil
liability for the failure to safeguard confidential information).
141. E.g., Shahani, supra note 32 (reporting on a federal indictment naming three men who
were believed to have hacked JPMorgan Chase).
142. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 70, at 1602.
143. Cotton Patch Café, Inc., v. Micros Sys., No. MJG-09-3242, 2012 WL 5986773, at *3 (D.
Md. Nov. 27, 2012).
144. Supra Part I (recognizing that software vendors almost universally shield themselves from
liability in the event of a breach of contract).
145. But in Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., a class of plaintiffs sued the data security
vendor whose products and services were used by the South Carolina Department of Revenue after
a breach of the department’s records resulted in unauthorized access to taxpayer records. 27 F.
Supp. 3d 871, 872–73 (N.D. Ill. 2014). The plaintiffs brought claims alleging violations of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, negligence, and invasion of privacy and contract (third-party beneficiary).
Id. at 873–74. The court dismissed the case based on a finding of lack of an actual injury sufficient
to support standing. Id. at 877–78. The court noted, in dicta, that Trustwave, the security software
vendor, was not a “consumer reporting agency” subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Id. at
882. It is unknown whether any of the other claims would have survived.
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many cases are not the same people with whom we have entrusted our
data in the first place.”146 Another problem is that those companies with
which consumers have entrusted their data (i.e., retailers, hotels, and
other consumer product and service providers) are not able, or perhaps
not willing, to ensure those responsible for securing consumer data (i.e.,
security software vendors) actually secure it or to take any responsibility
after that data is stolen. But should consumers just concede to this
situation?
II. IT IS UNFAIR NOT TO TELL
This Article proceeds on the assumption that something should be done
to alter the prevailing relationship between security software vendors and
commercial licensees of security software and systems. Something must
be done to incentivize the development of better commercial security
systems, with or without the participation of the companies buying those
systems, to better protect consumer and client data. This Article’s
proposal for accomplishing these objectives relies on a combination of
required information disclosure from security software vendors and
penalties based on existing unfair trade laws in the event of
nondisclosure. Specifically, this Article proposes that regulators consider
deeming it an “unfair trade practice” if a commercial security software
vendor knows or should have known of a vulnerability in its software, but
does not notify all of its licensees of that known defect.
Part II.A discusses the weaknesses of the existing, voluntary
information-sharing programs and the benefits to be gained by disclosing
cybersecurity information, including software-vulnerability information.
Part II.B proposes that a required vulnerabilities disclosure fits well
within existing jurisprudence defining “unfair trade practices” in the
cybersecurity arena.
A. Information Sharing as a Data Security Measure
Cybersecurity information sharing (“CIS”)147 has its detractors,
certainly,148 but the prevailing view notes that by sharing information,
146. Mark Rasch, How Much Does a Security Breach Actually Cost? And Who Pays for It?,
REG.
(July
15,
2005,
6:02
AM),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/07/15/who_pays_for_security_breaches.
147. Cybersecurity information sharing (“CIS”) can be defined as “the collection, analysis,
distribution, and utilization of any information relevant to a cybersecurity threat.” Ford, supra note
67, at 123.
148. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Sharing Shortcomings, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 465, 468–78
(2015) (critiquing the current policy focus of CIS on information sharing). CIS that involves
sharing information with the government also raises privacy concerns. For example, the Center for
Democracy and Technology, a nonprofit think tank that advocates for online civil liberties, opposed
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companies will be better able to counter a security problem that is
otherwise, perhaps, virtually intractable.149 In any event, CIS as a tool
against cyberthreats has firmly arrived on the scene.
There are many reasons why CIS among data-theft targets is an
effective deterrent. Attacks on networked computers continue to increase
in number and in sophistication.150 Large-scale breaches of corporate
data are increasingly attributable to an advanced persistent threat
(“APT”), not some opportunistic “hack.”151 An APT exists when the
attacker (1) has an above-average expertise to carry out more
sophisticated exploits, (2) is determined to achieve his or her goal, and
(3) also has sufficient resources to support his or her actions. An APT
family of threats usually identifies targeted attacks that take place over a
prolonged period of time where the attacker will not give up before
achieving his or her goal. In contrast, opportunistic attacks usually result
from the attacker’s consistent scan of the environment and an impulsive
attack when the opportunity presents itself. Historically, APT was a term
reserved for statewide cyberattacks. But recently, the industry identifies
a hack as an APT when the primary goal of the hack is simply to steal
data. The technical sophistication of an APT is often enhanced by adding
social-engineering strategies, like spear phishing, to the mix.152
By sharing information about the nature and target of past attacks,
companies may become aware of potential vulnerabilities of which they
the Consumer Information Security Act (“CISA”) on the grounds that the statute would facilitate
government surveillance and other individual privacy violations.
149. E.g., Sales, supra note 128, at 1546 (“Effective cyber-security depends on the generation
and exchange of information.”).
150. E.g., Ford, supra note 67, at 121 (surveying the incidence and cost of increased networked
computer targeted attacks); Ariana L. Johnson, Cybersecurity for Financial Institutions: The
Integral Role of Information Sharing in Cyber Attack Mitigation, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 277, 283
(2016) (explaining further why financial institutions are particularly vulnerable to attacks).
151. Advanced persistent threat (“APT”) implies a targeted and systematic attack, whereas an
“opportunistic” hack is not.
152. Phishing is a type of social engineering—a high-tech scam that uses e-mail or websites to
deceive people into disclosing personal information useful in identity theft, such as credit card
numbers, bank account information, social security numbers, passwords, or other sensitive
information. Spear-phishing attacks target a smaller, more select group of individuals (e.g. users
of a specific website, members of an organization, etc.) with the primary goal of bypassing the
security perimeter of the target organization. Spear phishing is different from regular phishing in
that it uses contextual information relevant to the recipient and spear phishing appears as if it was
sent from somebody within the organization. FIREEYE, INC., SPEAR-PHISHING ATTACKS WHY
THEY
ARE
SUCCESSFUL
AND
HOW
TO
STOP
THEM
3
(2016),
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/fireeye-how-stop-spearphishing.pdf; see generally
EUROPEAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, INTERNET ORGANISED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT
(IOCTA) 2016 REPORT (2016), https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/internet-organised-crimethreat-assessment-iocta-2016 (identifying spear phishing as a key threat and recommending various
protocols for future developments in spear phishing).
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had no prior knowledge; gain understanding of the methods used by the
hackers (the “tactics, techniques, and procedures” (“TTPs”)); and be
better able to design effective defenses against those TTPs.153 Detecting
threats and vulnerabilities and investigating the TTPs is costly and time
consuming.154 Any one company can afford only so much analysis. With
widespread sharing of the results of cybersecurity analysis, every
company, at a very low cost, can acquire a much more robust inventory
of threat and vulnerability information than it could ever achieve with its
own resources.155 The same is true for effective response and mitigation
actions: the exchange of information about these issues increases the
speed and accuracy with which companies can react to attacks.156 TTPs
are constantly evolving, such that effective data security requires constant
innovation. Measures that encourage companies to share information
about perceived and actual security threats, and to cooperate in
developing new technologies, are likely to improve data security for
all.157 Accordingly, a wide range of scholars argue that “intelligence
dissemination” is likely one of the best tools for enabling an effective
cybersecurity strategy.158
Many different varieties of CIS are certainly in use today. Government
efforts to improve national security, including the security of critical
industries, drive most of the CIS. These efforts include, inter alia, the
provision by government agencies of cyberthreat and vulnerability
information to industry about cyberthreats and vulnerabilities, and the
encouragement of information exchange between government and
private industries. Thus, for example, the Clinton administration
encouraged the creation of industry-specific Information Sharing and
Analysis Centers,159 which share threat and mitigation information with
153. Ford, supra note 67, at 123.
154. Id. at 124.
155. Id. at 125.
156. Johnson, supra note 150, at 294.
157. See S. REP. NO. 114-32, at 2 (2015) (“The [CISA] believes that ‘such increased sharing
will drive public and private sector cybersecurity efforts to develop key new technologies and
processes.’”).
158. See, e.g., Craig et al., supra note 7, at 726 (arguing that an effective proactive cybersecurity
strategy should focus on real-time detection, attribution of threat actors, flexibility of response
actions, and intelligence dissemination); Ford, supra note 7, at 131 (noting that attributing
malicious attacks requires correlation with other intelligence sources); Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra
note 96, at 353 (“The best step policymakers could take immediately would be to encourage
reporting of security breaches.”); see generally Johnson, supra note 150 (suggesting that utilizing
cyberintelligence may create better network monitoring and more effective detection and
mitigation).
159. E.g., WHITE PAPER: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION’S POLICY ON CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 63, at 10 (May 22, 1998),
http://csrc.nist.gov/drivers/documents/paper598.pdf (noting that the creation of information
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industry partners and with the government.160 Late in 2015, President
Obama signed the Computer Information Sharing Act, which directs the
United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and other
government agencies to provide information to the private sector and
allows private-sector companies to share “cyberthreat indicators” and
defensive measures with each other and with the government in exchange
for immunity from liability from antitrust and other laws. 161 Wholly
private initiatives to promote CIS have also emerged, including, for
example, the Cyber Threat Alliance, which welcomes “all organizations”
to share in cybercrime threat intelligence.162
Information on software vulnerabilities is especially critical in
improving data security.163 To this end, DHS’ United States Computer
Emergency Readiness Team sponsors a national vulnerabilities database
(“NVD”) (i.e., a compilation of standards-based, or defined
vulnerabilities, reported voluntarily).164 Though the database currently
contains almost 80,000 identified vulnerabilities,165 by most accounts the
list is wholly inadequate.166 The efficacy of the program depends, to a
large extent, on the willingness of software vendors to disclose
vulnerabilities, or “bugs,” of which they have become aware, but
software vendors may be reluctant to publicly disclose vulnerabilities for
many reasons.167 Disclosure may cause a vendor to lose customers and
sharing and analysis centers in private sector industries is “strongly encouraged”).
160. About NCI, NAT’L COUNCIL ISACS, http://www.nationalisacs.org/about-nci (last visited
May 10, 2017).
161. THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., GUIDANCE TO ASSIST NONFEDERAL ENTITIES TO SHARE CYBER THREAT INDICATORS AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES WITH
FEDERAL ENTITIES UNDER THE CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2015, at 4
(2016).
162. McAfee and Symantec Join Fortinet and Palo Alto Networks as Co-founders of the
Industry’s
First
Cyber
Threat
Alliance,
CYBER
THREAT
ALLIANCE,
https://cyberthreatalliance.org/pr/mcafee-and-symantic-join-fortinet-and-palo-alto-networks-asco-founders.html. The founding members of Cyber Threat Alliance were Fortinet, McAfee, Palo
Alto Networks, and Symantec. Whether, and to what extent, private CIS is discouraged or even
prohibited by antitrust and other laws is outside the scope of this Article.
163. Oriola, supra note 3, at 481 (“It is sacrosanct that vulnerabilities detection research is
invaluable to computer and network security, as it facilitates the discovery and disclosure of latent
‘zero day’ or new vulnerabilities that could be exploited by unscrupulous hackers if left
uncorrected.”).
164. NAT’L VULNERABILITY DATABASE, https://nvd.nist.gov (last updated Mar. 20, 2017).
165. Current CVSS Score Distribution for All Vulnerabilities, CVE DETAILS,
http://www.cvedetails.com/ (last visited May 6, 2017).
166. Other vulnerability databases exist on the market as well. For example, the open source
vulnerability database reports over 120,000 vulnerabilities. The exact number is unknown. For
more information, see The Duality of Expertise: Microsoft, OSVBD (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://blog.osvdb.org/ (last visited May 6, 2017) (providing information about security
vulnerabilities in computerized equipment).
167. With some exceptions, reported vulnerabilities are disclosed to the public within forty-five
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potential buyers,168 whether the vulnerability is fixed, or patched.169
Creating the patch can be expensive, which means there may be a
disincentive to do so.170 Disclosure may increase the risk that a hacker
can exploit the code, whether or not the vulnerability is patched.171
The vendor is certainly not the only candidate who can report a
vulnerability: users and “independent security researchers” of all types,
including malicious hackers, also engage in vulnerabilities-detection
research.172 These individuals or entities may report the vulnerability to
the NVD, make the information public,173 report to the vendor, or sell the
information to the highest bidder in the market for software
vulnerabilities. Sellers in this market include, for example, brokers who
legitimately buy and sell information, as well as criminal hackers. And
buyers in this market range from software vendors or users (e.g., both
Facebook and Mozilla have “bounty hunter” programs for vulnerabilities
detection)174 to government agencies.175 This market raises many
concerns, not the least of which is the threat of criminal blackmail by a
hacker in possession of a “zero-day” vulnerability key to the preservation
of national security.176 For purposes of a user obtaining accurate
information on software vulnerabilities, the concern is that these black
markets are inefficient, because they are “unregulated, unstructured, and
ill-defined.”177
A number of the problems with existing information exchange
programs would be solved, or at least alleviated, if the industry strongly
encouraged—with the threat of an unfair trade practice charge—
commercial security software vendors to report vulnerabilities to their
days after the initial report. Vulnerability Disclosure Policy, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INST.,
http://www.cert.org/vulnerability-analysis/vul-disclosure.cfm? (last visited May 10, 2017).
168. Rahul Telang & Sunil Wattal, An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Software
Vulnerability Announcements on Firm Stock Price, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE
ENGINEERING 544, 548 (Aug. 2007), http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/rtelang/tse.published.pdf.
169. E.g., Derek E. Bambauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1063
(2011) (positing that vendors face reduced reputational or market pressures to improve security
when vulnerabilities are disclosed).
170. Id. at 1065.
171. Id. at 1064.
172. Id. at 1065.
173. For example, Google, through its Project Zero, uncovers and reports previously
undisclosed computer software vulnerabilities. Chris Evans, Announcing Project Zero, GOOGLE
ONLINE
SECURITY
BLOG
(July
15,
2014),
https://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.de/2014/07/announcing-project-zero.html.
174. Bambauer & Day, supra note 169, at 1066.
175. Id.; see generally Bambauer, supra note 25 (advocating for and proposing governmental
regulation for known and unknown threats).
176. Bambauer & Day, supra note 169, at 1062.
177. Oriola, supra note 3, at 512.
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licensees. This threat would reduce the ineffectiveness that stems from
the “voluntariness” that plagues the NVD and other private informationexchange programs.178 Although reputational damage may still result
from disclosure to licensees, this limited disclosure would presumably
reduce the risk that competitors could use vulnerabilities information to
the disadvantage of the vendor, or that hackers could exploit the
vulnerability. To the extent the vulnerabilities markets include vendors
and software users, this regularized exchange of information would be a
practical first step in regulating one corner of the vulnerabilities market,
surely a beneficial result.179
B. Data Security and Unfair Trade Laws
The FTC is authorized to enforce section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (“FTC Act”), which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts”
that affect commerce.180 Between 2002 and 2015, the FTC exerted this
regulatory authority in sixty enforcement actions against companies that
“engaged in unfair or deceptive trade practices that put consumers’
privacy at unreasonable risk.”181 Specifically, in these actions, the FTC
protects the privacy of consumers’ data.182 Scholars argue about the
proper administrative tools that the FTC should use (e.g., adjudication as
opposed to rulemaking),183 but agree that the FTC has a legitimate role
in improving data privacy. Indeed, by some measures, the FTC has
“evolved into the broadest and most powerful data protection agency in
the United States.”184
An act may be “unfair or deceptive,” causing the privacy of consumer
data to be put at unreasonable risk, if, for example, a company fails to
follow its privacy policies by engaging in the unauthorized collection or

178. E.g.,
Become
a
Member,
CYBER
THREAT
ALLIANCE,
http://cyberthreatalliance.org/membership/ (last visited May 10, 2017) (recruiting a diverse
membership representative of the cybersecurity industry).
179. Oriola, supra note 3, at 514 (“[T]here is a good case for discouraging underground markets
in software vulnerabilities due to their propensity for perpetuating malicious hacking activities.”).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
181. FED. TRADE COMM’N, 2015 PRIVACY AND SECURITY UPDATE 4 (2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update2015/privacy_and_security_data_update_2015-web_0.pdf. The FTC’s authority in this regard was
upheld in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 612 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, 799
F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
182. Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection,
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2236 (2015).
183. See, e.g., Hurwitz, supra note 75, at 988 (noting that “the FTC’s current approach is
arguably the most aggressive use of adjudicatory procedures to develop a substantive area of law
that any agency has embraced in the modern era of administrative law”).
184. Hartzog & Solove, supra note 182, at 2236.
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distribution of data,185 or if a data-security measure fails. Thus, for
example, the FTC claimed that Lifelock, Inc., an American identity theft
protection company, made deceptive claims about its identity theft
protection services, and investigated Oracle, a computer technology
company, when the company failed to properly notify consumers of a
known security risk in software updates.186 Pursuant to FTC guidance, a
company housing consumer data may engage in an “unfair” trade practice
if it fails to provide reasonable security measures to protect that data
against unauthorized disclosure.187
The FTC Act defines an “unfair” act as one that (1) causes actual or
likely substantial injury to consumers; (2) consumers cannot reasonably
avoid; and (3) is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers
or to competition.188 The FTC’s position is that “an injury may be
sufficiently substantial . . . if it does a small harm to a large number of
people, or if it raises a significant risk of concrete harm.” 189 The actual
“act” that is alleged to be unfair, in regard to the security of consumer
data housed in corporate files, is the failure of the company to take
“reasonable” security measures.190
Thus, in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., for example, the agency
charged that Wyndham, inter alia, “failed to employ commonly-used
methods to require user IDs and passwords that are difficult for hackers
to guess’” and “did not require the use of complex passwords for access
to the Wyndham-branded hotels’ property management systems and
allowed the use of easily guessed passwords.”191 As charged by the FTC,
Wyndham’s “unfair acts” resulted in substantial, actual injury: three data
breaches and the exposure of over 600,000 consumer card numbers,
causing fraudulent, unreimbursed credit card charges, among other costs
to the consumers.192
185. Moncada, supra note 77, at 918–19.
186. Privacy and Security Update, supra note 181, at 4.
187. Timothy E. Deal, Moving Beyond “Reasonable”: Clarifying the FTC’s Use of Its
Unfairness Authority in Data Security Enforcement Actions, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2227, 2240
(2016) (noting that complaints frequently allege a defendant’s failure to employ adequate data
security measures); Privacy and Security Update, supra note 181, at 4.
188. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012).
189. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of the Consumer
Unfairness Jurisdiction (1980), reprinted in Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1072–88 (1984).
190. Deal, supra note 187, at 2240.
191. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 624 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, 799
F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015). Similar allegations of “failed” or inadequate data security measures were
made in administrative actions against GMR Transcription Services, Inc., and LabMD, Inc., among
others. Privacy and Security Update, supra note 181, at 4.
192. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d at 623. On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected
Wyndham’s argument that “unfair” required something in addition to the specific statutory
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Just as a company’s deficient security measures can cause harm to
hundreds of thousands of consumers, so, too, can vulnerabilities in the
security software used by that company to protect consumer data.193
According to one report, only as few as just ten vulnerabilities (among
thousands known), in a company’s infrastructure led to the theft of
hundreds of millions of consumer records in 2015.194 When a company’s
software vulnerability causes a substantial breach and data theft, it seems
“unfair” if consumers suffer injury and are not subsequently remedied.
An act can also be “unfair” if it caused “likely substantial injury to
consumers.”195 What is sufficiently probable to constitute “likely” injury
is a bit murky, but the FTC Act clearly draws a distinction between
substantial injury that “has” occurred and an injury that “may” occur.196
In regard to data security, the FTC has utilized the definition of “unfair”
to launch an investigation of Verizon arising from its shipment of routers
with outdated encryption standards, leaving customers “vulnerable to
hackers.”197 Pursuant to its statutory authority, the FTC could also
investigate a security-software provider if a vulnerability in its software
is likely to cause widespread injury to consumers. Not every software
vulnerability is of a type or magnitude that poses a “likely” threat of
substantial harm, but there is data available that the FTC could use to
evaluate the risk of breach.198
What, specifically, the software vendor has done that is “unfair” when
elements, but did not otherwise rule on the lower court’s findings regarding the sufficiency of the
allegations. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 245. Wyndham also claimed that consumers
could “reasonably avoid” this harm by demanding that their card issuers rescind the unauthorized
charges, but the court, in ruling on the motion to dismiss, declined to make what would in effect be
this ruling as a matter of law. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d at 625.
193. Bambauer, supra note 25, at 1024 (“The combination of vulnerabilities and Internet
exposure means that failures of seemingly invulnerable systems are legion.”).
194. McCandless, supra note 40; Verizon’s Report, supra note 16.
195. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012).
196. Hartzog & Solove, supra note 182, at 2279–80.
197. Letter from Maneesha Mithal, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Privacy & Identity Prot., FTC, to Dana
Rosenfeld,
Kelley
Drye
(Nov.
12,
2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/closing_letters/verizon-communicationsinc./141112verizonclosingletter.pdf.
198. For example, each vulnerability in the national vulnerabilities database is evaluated using
the common vulnerability scoring system (“CVSS”). The framework is composed of three
indicator groups: base (the intrinsic qualities of a vulnerability), temporal (the characteristics of a
vulnerability that change over time), and environmental (the characteristics of a vulnerability that
are unique to a user’s environment). Each vulnerability is scored on a scale from zero to ten based
on the base metrics, with “ten” being most severe. The CVSS scores of the ten vulnerabilities
through which the vast majority of consumer records were stolen in 2015 range between 4.3 and
7.5, with the majority being in the upper end of the interval. See also NVD CVSS Support, NVD,
https://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm (last updated Jan. 25, 2017) (providing an open framework for
communicating the characteristics and impacts of IT vulnerabilities).
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it licenses insecure software is another issue. Just as a company is
generally required to take “reasonable” security measures, a securitysoftware vendor could be required to license “reasonably secure”
software. Pursuant to such a standard, a security-software vendor would
be subject to FTC action should a substantial risk of harm result if its
software is not “reasonably secure.” Defining “reasonable security
measures” is no simple task, however, and attempting to define
“reasonably secure software” is probably even more difficult.
As noted throughout this Article, “[b]ugs happen.”199 But usually,
security software “fails” because someone intentionally and repeatedly
tries to make it fail.200 The notion of imposing specific bounds on
whether that software is somehow “flawed” in such a situation is perhaps
somewhat attenuated. Surely, if a windshield has design flaws such that
the windshield shatters unexpectedly when a driver drives the car down
the road, the manufacturer should be responsible for the consequences.
If, however, the windshield shatters only because someone has repeatedly
hit the glass with a hammer, perhaps the outcome, and the responsible
party, is not so clear.
Similarly, the fact that a hacker has selected a particular code to
infiltrate is largely a matter of chance.201 But once a company identifies
a vulnerability, all objections related to “chance” fall away. Software
with a known and material security vulnerability does not fit within any
definition of “reasonably secure.” A software code cannot be made
completely error free, ex ante, but once a company identifies an error, it
can, with some expenditure of time and money, patch or remove and
replace the vulnerable software. The rules regarding liability should
reflect the fact that once a company identifies a specific vulnerability, it
is no longer a random target, and its software no longer falls under any
definition of “reasonably secure.”202
Returning to the fundamental question of whether a particular act is
“unfair,” it should be noted that the definitions of “unfair” and
“deceptive” overlap.203 There is arguably an element of “deception”
when a security-software vendor, knowing of a vulnerability, does not
199. Bambauer and Day, supra note 169, at 1060.
200. Id. at 1061.
201. E.g., Oriola, supra note 3, at 478 (describing “software penetration testing” used by
hackers to probe for software vulnerabilities).
202. For example, if the vulnerabilities detection research industry uncovers and announces a
vulnerability, unless and until the software vendor takes action to fix it, hackers can take advantage
of that known defect. E.g., Bambauer, supra note 25, at 1048 (discussing the markets for “zeroday” attack information); Oriola, supra note 3, at 482 (noting that disclosure may facilitate attacks
by hackers “through the knowledge of vulnerabilities they otherwise would not have had”).
203. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 245 (3d Cir. 2015).
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disclose it to a licensee. This is not to suggest, however, that under these
circumstances the vendor has committed a “deceptive” act within the
meaning of the statute.204 But it seems fair that the vendor should
disclose a known risk; therefore, the FTC and the applicable laws should
recognize that if the vendor does not disclose this risk, it has acted
“unfairly.”
In addition, or as an alternative to the FTC, state regulators might play
a role in holding security software vendors accountable for
vulnerabilities. These regulators already rely on state statutes, including
the “little FTC acts”205 of the fifty states and the District of Columbia,206
to protect consumers’ data security. For example, the California Attorney
General regularly investigates companies for engaging in “unfair
competition” by failing to ensure data privacy or security. 207 In 2013,
after Citibank failed to fix a known software vulnerability, the State of
California filed a complaint against Citibank in the Superior Court of
Alameda County and alleged that Citibank violated several laws,
including the prohibition against “unfair” competition.208 For the reasons
proposed above in regard to federal law and the FTC, it would seem
reasonable for the State to have prosecuted the vendor whose security
software contained the vulnerability exploited in the breach, had that
vendor known of the vulnerability and not advised Citibank.209
Consumers may also play a role in holding security software vendors
accountable for their failure to disclose risky vulnerabilities.210 For
example, consumers can now bring state consumer-protection claims
against the companies housing their data after a breach.211 But these
204. A practice is “deceptive” if it is “likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the
circumstances.” Moncada, supra note 77, at 917–18. The consumers whose data is housed in
company files have no direct relationship with the security software vendor which sold protective
software to the company.
205. Ryan P. O’Quinn & Thomas Watterson, Fair is Fair—Reshaping Alaska’s Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 295, 308 (2011).
206. Id. at 303.
207. Privacy Enforcement Actions, ST. CAL. DEP’T JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/privacyenforcement-actions (last visited May 10, 2017).
208. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2008).
209. Whether the definition of “unfair” in California’s statute is or should be precisely the same
as under the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) is a topic outside the scope of this Article.
See generally Alexander N. Cross, Federalizing “Unfair Business Practice” Claims under
California’s Unfair Competition Law, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 489 (2013) (noting inconsistent
applications of the statutory definition in the California lower courts and arguing that an approach
that adopts section 5 of the FTC Act’s definition of “unfair business practices” is the best approach).
210. For the reasons discussed above, limiting liability to these circumstances seems fair and
reasonable.
211. Unlike the FTC Act, state consumer protection statutes grant consumers a private right of
action. O’Quinn & Watterson, supra note 205, at 303; see, e.g., In re Cmty. Health Sys., Inc.,
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cases face formidable obstacles. For example, courts struggle to
determine what types of injury caused by data theft confer Article III
standing on the consumers whose data has been stolen,212 and many class
action lawsuits falter for this reason alone.213 Other issues regarding
damages may preclude recovery, such as the “economic loss rule” in
some states that limits recoverable damages to “ascertainable” or
“pecuniary” loss.214 Some state consumer-protection laws provide for a
private right of action only to enforce prior regulatory orders, 215 or to
prohibit class actions entirely.216 These are only examples; the consumer
protection statutes of the states and the circumstances of each data breach
case are too varied to enumerate all the issues encountered by plaintiffs
in these cases. But just as the law is evolving so that consumers can hold
companies accountable for failing to protect their data, so, too, might that
law accommodate “unfair trade practice” claims against the vendors of
the software that is actually on the front line in terms of protecting the
data.
CONCLUSION
Data breaches have become so common that some consumers may be
suffering from “data breach fatigue.”217 And it is true that when business
Customer Sec. Data Breach Litig. (MDL 2595), No. 15-CV-222-KOB, 2016 WL 4732630, at *18–
19 (Sept. 12, 2016 N.D. Ala.) (noting how named plaintiffs alleged violations of unfair trade
practice laws of Florida, Nebraska, Ohio, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Tennessee,
arising from data breach); In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d
1154, 1157 (D. Minn. 2014) (alleging similar violations); In re Sony Gaming Networks &
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 985 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (bringing claims
under the California Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising Act, and the Consumers Legal
Remedies Act).
212. E.g., Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that
customers plausibly alleged standing); see also Green v. eBay Inc., No. 14-1688, 2015 WL
2066531, at *6 (E.D. La. May 4, 2015) (finding that the plaintiff had not adequately alleged
standing and granting the motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); In re
Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 962 (S.D. Cal.
2014) (concluding the allegations were sufficient to establish standing). Whether and to what
extent future harm is a compensable element of damage for any particular cause of action asserted
in a lawsuit arising from data breach is a topic beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion
regarding the validity of such harm, see generally Rachel Yoo, An Expected Harm Approach to
Compensating Consumers for Unauthorized Information Disclosures, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1
(2012).
213. The list is a long one. For an example, see generally Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, 27
F. Supp. 3d 871 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
214. See, e.g., In re Target Corp., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1162 (stating that the plaintiff’s injuries are
cognizable under each state’s consumer-protection laws).
215. Id. at 1163.
216. Id.
217. Elise Hu, I Feel Nothing: The Home Depot Hack and Data Breach Fatigue, NPR (Sept. 8,
2014, 2:36 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/09/03/345539074/i-feel-
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data is breached, the consumers whose data is stolen usually suffer little,
if any actual out-of-pocket loss from the breach.218 But those losses do
add up to billions of consumer dollars transferred to the pockets of
thieves, and potentially very large costs to the breached company.
Moreover, the “Internet of Things” portends more pervasive and more
dangerous consequences from data breaches in the future. Even now,
when a data breach may have impacted the outcome of a national
presidential election,219 consumers and consumer protection advocates
should remain vigilant in the fight against the hackers.
Given the digitization of the world, and the fact that data can so easily
be replicated, stored, and transmitted, preventing unauthorized access to
data is probably an impossible task. But any known chink in the armor
protecting that data should surely be repaired. Security vulnerabilities in
software are widespread; any software can contain a security
vulnerability. But when a company buys and pays for software
specifically to provide data security—as opposed to operating a computer
program—the vulnerability seems particularly problematic. Yet, for
reasons explored in Part I, the companies purchasing that software appear
unable or unwilling to hold the seller accountable. To bolster the front
line of defense against consumer data theft (i.e., commercial security
software and systems) federal and state regulators should consider
holding the vendors of security software accountable for an “unfair trade
practice” if a known vulnerability in that software is not reported to the
licensees. To avoid this threatened action, vendors may well “out” the
vulnerability on their own, enabling the companies using that software to
close the door before the thieves arrive.

nothing-the-home-depot-hack-and-data-breach-fatigue (“You’ve certainly read the what-to-do-inthe-event-of-a-hack stories here, and elsewhere. How many times have we recommended looking
at your credit card bills for any weird purchases, or had security experts remind us to change our
passwords, or use two-factor authentication, or not trust the cloud with our most private images?”).
218. See generally Riedy & Hanus, supra note 26 (“The theft of personal information causes
minimal harm to consumers, while the business-the putative defendant-suffers far greater costs
associated with a breach.”).
219. Douglas Ernst, Wikileaks Emails Reveal Podesta Urging Clinton Camp to “Dump”
Emails,
WASH.
TIMES
(Nov.
1,
2016),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/nov/1/wikileaks-emails-reveal-john-podestaurging-hillar/ (reporting on a “new round of WikiLeaks documents released . . . reveal[ing] a March
2015 exchange between Hillary Clinton’s campaign chairman and confidant Cheryl Mills on the
need to ‘dump’ emails”).

